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STATE, CHURCH AND NATION IN THE SERBIAN AND CROATIAN SPEAKING LANDS OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY, 1860-1914

The Habsburg empire is a *locus classicus* for the study of the relations of State, Church and people. Lacking an ethnic basis for their rule, the Habsburgs led their polyglot realm to great power status in the early modern period as the defenders of Catholic Christianity against Muslim Turks and Protestant heretics. A special relationship developed between State and Catholic Church which had particular significance in a polity where ethnic, religious and social subordination often overlapped, particularly among the Monarchy's Orthodox minorities. The national mobilisation movements of previously non-dominant groups in the nineteenth century therefore carried a religious as well as a purely ethnic charge. What gave the resultant complications their specific character, however, was that over time patterns of hierarchy and subordination in the Monarchy had become quite subtly graduated. Strengthened by the Enlightenment and Joseph II's Toleration Act of 1781, a distinct 'confessionalising' Habsburg policy to their Orthodox subjects had emerged, which gave them a certain position on the ladder of privilege, while maintaining the Catholic Church's dominant position at the top. By equipping Orthodox Serbs (and much later Romanians) with recognised church structures, the central government could present religious equity as national justice, win a counterweight on sensitive borders to dubiously loyal Magyars and work through grateful hierarchies in close touch with their flock. As the nineteenth century wore on, the identification of ethnicity with religion increasingly served the function of Habsburg 'divide and rule' in the case of groups like Serbs and Croats, whom new notions of identity threatened to bring together. This paper will deal with the clash of old confessional and new national organising principles in the reshaping of church-state relations in the incipient nationalist age.

Nowhere were such issues more germane than in the Monarchy's south Slav lands. After the Bosnian occupation of 1878, some 2.3 million Catholics and 2 million Orthodox speakers of Serb or Croat lived under Habsburg rule. With localised exceptions Serbs were Orthodox and Croats Catholic, though the reverse was not always true – most Bosnian Catholics, in particular, lacked a specific national name. Mutual identification of religion and nationality was strongest among the Serbs of the Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) Patriarchate, founded on the basis of the Privileges of 1690-91 awarded by the Emperor Leopold I to the largest influx of Serbs to escape northwards, under their patriarch, from Turkish rule. It rested, too, on the destruction of Serb political institutions by the Turks, leaving the Church as sole ethnic marker: 'The Serb people has only one common symbol, namely the great and Holy Church which has been preserved when all else has perished', as one Serb Patriarch put it in the early eighteenth century.[i] The Leopoldine Privileges granted the Serbs freedom of worship and the right to elect their religious leader in national church congresses, enabling the development of a church province notable for its rich monasteries, situated partly in Hungary proper, partly in Croatia-Slavonia. The autonomy, which gave the Habsburg Serbs their ethnic badge of identity in hierarchical Habsburg society, had thus formally a purely religious character. In return wealthy, ordered Karlowitz gave Austria her credentials as an Orthodox power in the unfolding Eastern Question, which pitted her against Russia in the struggle

for influence among Orthodox Slavs in the declining Turkish empire, able to supply fledgling Balkan states with church leaders, as when the Patriarch consecrated the metropolitan of Belgrade, himself a Karlowitz man at Serb government request as late as 1883.[ii] Patriarch Rajačić proved wholly loyal to Austrian interests in 1848.

Belonging to the majority religion, the Catholic Croats had less need to assert a specifically religious identity. Seeking to reinvigorate a historic consciousness which had been eroded by administrative partition and Magyar pressure, Croat 'Illyrians' in the1830s appealed to the modern principle of linguistic nationalism, adopting the majority štokavski dialect as their literary medium, spoken by the majority of Croats and all Serbs. Modern Croat historians challenge Yugoslavist interpretations of Ljudevit Gaj's language reform, seeing it more as an up-to-date means of legitimising defence of Croatian 'municipal rights', or historic autonomy, than of shaping a Yugoslav destiny.[iii] Linguistic and historic rights dominated the utterances of nationalist politicians; Catholicism provided the underlying cement of Croatian nationhood. When the Croatian idea was propagated in Dalmatia from the 1860s it gained support only among Catholics, not the Orthodox minority, and its leading exponent, Mihovil Pavlinović, was a Catholic priest. The Catholic Church had a powerful presence. The Archbishop of Zagreb was the constitutional deputy of the Croatian governor (the Ban); the bishop of Djakovo's estates made him the wealthiest man in the country. The Franciscan clergy of inner Dalmatia and Bosnia had strong patriotic traditions. There was an institute *pro gente illyrica*, the San Girolamo, in Rome. Catholic Croatia stayed loyal to the dynasty in 1848. The centrality of religion to south Slav nationhood, whether explicit or implicit, belonged to the conventional wisdom of government and rested on south Slav social reality. But what challenges faced the confessionalising model of government derived from it in a revolutionary age?

Two may be mentioned here. The first was the Herderian idea of linguistic nationalism implicit in Gaj's reforms. Emilian Turczynski has rightly warned historians not to exaggerate the Herderian roots of Balkan nationalism at the expence its religious sociological base.[iv] But maybe this necessary revision can underplay the emancipation from religious concepts possible even within confessional structures. By the mid-nineteenth century the Balkan and particularly the Bosnian church and school commune, operating in the towns under lay merchant control – the Phanariot hierarchy being out of touch – had become accessible to ideas of cultural nationality. Sociologically, the men who ran the leading Bosnian commune committees were the products of an ethno-religious framework, but insofar as they clearly distinguished separate routes to Orthodoxy and Serbdom, they could certainly conceive, at least in the abstract, of a non-Orthodox Serb. The politics of the Austrian administration of Bosnia was largely to devolve into a struggle between a confessionalising administration and a 'nationally conscious' Serb urban class for ideological control of the rural population.

The second challenge to the politics of confessionalism came, ironically, from government itself. Until 1848 the conventional wisdom of the dynasty saw the south Slavs as a counterweight to the Magyars. In the 1860s the emperor cut his losses and accommodated only the strongest opponents of neo-absolutist rule, the Magyars. The creation of a dualist Austria-Hungary in 1867 restructured dominant/non-dominant relations in the monarchy along national lines. In place of common subjection to an absolutist dynasty and the dominant religion shared by the majority came subjection of a Slav-Romance majority to two governments controlled by Magyar and Austro-German liberals. Yet the new dominant groups, in changing the terms of the game for themselves, continued to apply the old confessionalising conventionalities to the smaller fry. This meant that in the liberal nationalist age religious issues would become ethnic time bombs.

The Karlowitz Patriarchate between Government and Laity

The Karlowitz Patriarchate bore the sharpest brunt of these changes. In the 1860s the commercial class which had long made Hungarian Serbs the most advanced branch of the Serb people was already influenced by the liberalising, secularising spirit of the age. Its leader, the lawyer Svetozar Miletić, broke explicitly with past views of Serbdom:

> 'National consciousness, this is our moral strength and it is all the stronger in that in recent times this consciousness has become something different…after 1848 we have acquired a national political consciousness.'[v]

Miletić's challenge to Patriarch Maširević's presidency of the Serb National Church Congress of 1865 symbolised lay rejection of clerical leadership among the Hungarian Serbs.[vi] Yet the emerging liberal intelligentsia did not repudiate the institutions of the old confessional order but proceeded to colonise them. The Serb Church autonomy statute of 1868 squeezed priests out of the presidency of the church communes, set laymen in the episcopal consistories and put Orthodox schools under lay control. Decisions passed by Miletic supporters in 1870-71 in congress sessions of 1870-71 went further, setting up new, lay-dominated eparchial (diocesan) assemblies, making the one-third clerical minority in the Congress electable by clergy and laity together and strengthening the role of the Congress in the administration of church property at the expence of the bishops' synod. In the view of a clerical historian consistorial government of the Church had been replaced by the Lutheran model.[vii]

The 1868 autonomy statute was one of several empowering Calvinists, Jews and Romanian Orthodox as well as Serbs, approved by the most principled Magyar liberal of the nineteenth century, József Eötvös. Eötvös was a Tocquevillian moderate aware of the region's relative backwardness, who believed the Churches, liberated from political tutelage, could find a new role of service within the new power, the sovereign nation, rather than the old, the authoritarian state. But this liberalism presupposed diversity in unity, cultural autonomy in the one Hungarian political nation.[viii] Miletić's pro-federal Serbian National Party, however, had captured the organs of Church autonomy as a substitute for Serb political power. Even Eötvös could not sanction this. After his death in 1871 Hungarian liberalism became little more than a vehicle for a Magyar nation-building project dedicated to preventing the development of political consciousness among the non-Magyar majority. In Karlowitz this meant restoring as far as possible the old system of clerical control of autonomous organs. The Congress decisions of 1870-71 were not approved till 1875, with a long list of amendments arbitrarily introduced into Franz Joseph's rescript. Congresses of 1881 and 1908 called to choose new Patriarchs ended in the imposition of government candidates (Anđelić, Bogdanović) who had been heavily defeated in successive ballots. Abrupt dissolution or adjournment of Congresses became the order of the day, as over attempts to impose a clericalising Normative Statute on communes (1892, 1897). Government laws enforcing the teaching of Magyar in primary schools (1879) or setting minimal wages for all teachers, with financial help on terms (1907), pushed the communal authorities into a corner, increasingly hollowing out the role the autonomy could play as an effective instrument of national life.

Of the three parties to these proceedings, the Orthodox hierarchy came off worst. Its self-image of leadership, close to the people but in league with government, fitted a confessionally-orientated system. Now it had to choose between the people and the government. Given popular liberal

triumphalism it could only choose the government, but it did so unhappily. Bishop Grujić told the authorities in 1871 that Miletic was not in opposition to Franz Joseph but only to particular Hungarian governments, which showed a weak grasp of liberal political theory. Patriarch Branković lamented that radical propaganda had turned the people against him as one who had sold them and his Church to the government. Patriarch Branković died mysteriously, perhaps by suicide, in 1913.

Only one Patriarch seems to have been untouched by qualms. German Anđelić told the Hungarian government in 1885 that 'in circumstances of attack on good order and system' he never deceived himself that 'the sober and better educated elements' were in the majority. But the Church was not endangered by Congress votes:

> The Greek Oriental Serb Church is an episcopal Church; this its character rests on divine and apostolic foundations.'[ix]

Its true organ was the bishops' synod. But his synod was resentfully aware that for the government they and their clerical aspirations were a mere tool in its battle with Serb nationalists, in pursuit of an eventual deal with an elusive lay 'moderate' party. The synodal document showed how difficult it was for the hierarchy to define the Church's national character now that this had become a slogan of the liberals. The expression 'National Church' reflected Hungarian Serbs' 'genetic' nationality and the 1690 Privileges, but it could not be understood to imply that the Church had a popular-representative character. Moreover, state supervision of the Church should be negative and protective, not positive and interventionist.[x]

Serb nationalists also had no cause for joy. The war of attrition with the government over defence of the autonomy was a 'labour of Sisyphus' [xi], in the course of which Miletic's united party broke up into Liberals, radicals and self-styled moderates, to the neglect of their institutions, particularly the schools.[xii] While social differentiation eventually brought the Radicals victory in the Congress elections of 1902, their policies, like the Monastic statute (1908) leasing monastic land in small plots to their peasant supporters, were opposed by the Liberal leader who saw no place for the *svetina* (plebeians) in the active nation.[xiii] Radicals were accused of letting their hostility to the hierarchy legitimise government intervention in church affairs which the Romanian Orthodox hierarchy had avoided. True, a well-funded proto-national institution like the autonomy could hardly be ignored; Slovaks, lacking such a historical base, lost their three *Gymnasien* to Magyar nationalism in the Dualist period; Serb institutions vegetated but survived. But the concept of the confessional nation had become too weak to bridge divisions in a community undergoing novel social strains.

The Hungarian government had most cause for satisfaction. The government's right to supervise schools, funds and voluntary associations was incontrovertible to the late nineteenth-century central European official mind. It could exploit the anomaly of radical Serb secularists seeking to exploit a religious autonomy dating from feudal times, while maintaining its own anomaly of a Hungarian national-liberal establishment defending the 'episcopal and conservative character' of a Serbian Church.[xiv] True, the government did not achieve a settlement of the autonomy dispute on its own terms with a body of moderate Serbs but it was not really pressed to settle, as Serbs quarrelled among themselves, the proportion of Serbs in Hungary fell from four to two and a half per cent in the Dualist period and relative Serb prosperity helped explain the existence of Serb 'moderates'. The leading Serb nineteenth-century novelist Jakov Ignjatović and long-standing secretary of the premier cultural institution *Matica srpska*, Antonije Hadžić, were Magyarophile. The eventual

suspension of the autonomy in 1912 passed off with little commotion. Yet the Radicals' rise from small minority to dominance casts some doubt on the government's hard-nosed stance in retrospect. Given Serb circumstances and Miletić's willingness for a Serb-Hungarian liberal alliance in the early 1860s such a breakdown in state-minority relations hardly seems inevitable.

The Movements for Cultural Autonomy in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The direct importance of the Karlowitz Patriarchate thus receded in this period. But the Karlowitx experience significantly influenced Austro-Hungarian policy in occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina. Backward Bosnia, with a mother-tongue literacy rating of perhaps two per cent, was home to three fiercely antagonistic groups, numbering 43% (Orthodox), 38% (Muslims) and 18% (Catholics) by the 1879 census; Jews were numerous only in Sarajevo. Apart from the Orthodox, only the Franciscan clergy claimed national names; Muslims called themselves Bosniaks or Turks. Giving little priority or education or land reform, the new Habsburg authorities had, however, by 1882 concluded agreements with the Vatican, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Ottoman Sheik-ul-Islam to establish native hierarchies for all three confessions. An Orthodox seminary was created which was to have a 'strictly moral and religious atmosphere'[xv]; the Franciscans, not wholly trusted, had to share their privilege of cure of souls with the new secular hierarchy. Through the Emperor's effective power to nominate religious leaders and the seminaries and consistories or their equivalent created for each confession, the administration was plainly aiming to reproduce the Karlowitz pattern of ruling south Slavs through their religious institutions. Indeed, the Bosnian administration professed to see neither Serbs nor Croats in the land, only Bosnians of three confessions enjoying equal rights. By identifying ethnicity with traditional religion the regime arrogated the modern sector of life for itself. For Bosnia's long-standing administrator, Joint Finance Minister Benjamin Kállay (1882-1903), only the westerner was capable of achieving the triumph of civil over religious law which was the key to progress. Thus the Karlowitz model in the age of imperialism of which the occupation was part had come to embody a subordinate civilisational status for 'oriental' Bosnians, rejecting the aspirations of the nascent Bosnian lay elites to claim modernity through affiliation with Serb or Croat nationalisms burgeoning elsewhere. Kállay particularly feared the Bosnian Serbs.[xvi]

However, this Karlowitz-orientated strategy failed in Bosnia. The regime never persuaded ordinary non-Catholics of the sincerity of its commitment to religious equality. Though the relations between Kállay and Joseph Stadler, first Catholic archbishop of Sarajevo (1881-1918), were personally tense – Stadler suspected Kállay of religious 'indifferentism' and Kállay was irritated by Stadler's sometimes importunate pursuit of Catholic interests – the need to build up the very poor but loyal Catholic community willy nilly produced what looked like a policy of positive discrimination. In the first 17 years of occupation the provincial government spent 40% more on Catholic causes than on the much more numerous Orthodox [xvii]; Catholics also were free to accept gifts from the wider Catholic world while donations from Orthodox Russia were frowned upon. A further key factor was Kállay's recognition of where power lay in the Monarchy. He dismissed non-Catholic discontent because of failure to implement the 1891 ordinance on religious conversions because of the greater importance of avoiding quarrels with Rome and because of support in Vienna for Stadler's irregular conversions 'reaching to the highest places', which made Muslim influence in the latter case 'quite infinitesimally small'.[xviii] When in 1883 Archbishop Stadler tartly reminded his Serb counterpart in Sarajevo, Sava Kosanović, that Catholicism was the religion of the ruling dynasty, Kosanović's reply was prohibited by the government in the interests of interconfessional

peace. Kosanović resigned two years later, claiming the government was not giving his Church sufficient protection.[xix]

True, the authorities eventually got the sort of hierarchy they wanted, through Mandić and Letica, appointed metropolitans of Sarajevo in 1896 and 1907 respectively. Both came from the Karlowitz patriarchate. But they were generals without an army. By 1901 still only 25 of 98 priests in the Banjaluka diocese had been educated in Reljevo Orthodox seminary[xx]. The lower clergy were burdened with more administrative chores at the same time as their prestige declined relative to emerging lay professionals, hitting their income from popular offerings. Kállay's exploitation of these difficulties through the introduction of irregular government hand-outs rather than a regular salary (*congrua*) caused many parish priests to throw their hand in with the lay-led petitioning movement for cultural autonomy in church and school matters which began in 1896. The movement arose out of official attempts to control the activities of the urban church and school communes which 'can but come on principle into permanent conflict with a uniform and purposeful state power', in Kállay's words; the instrument of control was to be a normative communal statute drawn from the programme of the Karlowitz conservatives.[xxi] The Serbs were joined in 1899 by a similar Muslim movement provoked by the conversions issue. After Kállay's death his successor conceded Serb and Muslim demands in 1905 and 1909 respectively, but the experience in opposition meanwhile gained fed into the political movements which dogged Habsburg attempts to incorporate Bosnia into the Monarchy after the 1908 annexation.

Why did government policy largely succeed in Karlowitz, whereas it failed in Bosnia? The Karlowitz Serbs did indeed experience a rise in civilisation after 1690, and were for long spared full Magyar feudalism; in Bosnia the new administration retained the privileges of beg and aga while the commercial development that took place brought in outside capital at the expence of Serb and Muslim artisans. This and the misconceived policies outlined above ensured the unity of the Bosnian autonomy movements and the isolation of the hierarchies. In another sense, nationalism could be said to have triumphed in both cases, Slav nationalism in Bosnia and Hungarian in Karlowitz. What was nationalism's appeal? Its central concept of a secular, linguistic identity offered an attractive role to new elites, as teachers of the new ideas to the people, in whose name nationalism claimed to speak. But notions of the people presupposed the power of numbers, which Slavs had in the one case and not the other. The Bosnian Serb communes, with their merchant-dominated executive committees, fruitfully combined elements of elitism and democracy in a way also found in forms of nineteenth-century Protestantism. The fact that this function was as yet confined to the urban communes did not mean, as a high official admitted, that the 'almost apathetic peasant' was about to become a 'national renegade'.[xxii] The Serb idea was establishing its hegemony.

Testimony to the strength of the new nationalism was that the Croatian idea was making headway in the very different circumstances of Bosnian Croats, where lay-dominated communes were absent and the Church hierarchy far stronger. The confessional view of the nation, as represented by the Croatian Catholic Association of Archbishop Stadler was outvoted in the post-1910 constitutional era by the Croatian National Union led by the fledgling lay intelligentsia, but with support from Stadler's Franciscan enemies. The CNU believed, unlike Stadler, that Catholicism and Croatdom were not coterminous, so that Bosnian Muslims could also be Croats, just as Serb nationalists saw them as Serbs. In the longer term, the underlying religious determinant stressed by the Archbishop has won out. In the late 1960s Bosnian Muslims won recognition as one of the nations of Yugoslavia, as 'Muslims', though this was an ethnic term and did not imply Islamic belief - made plainer in Muslims' adoption of the national name 'Bosniak' in 1993. However, before 1914 the

time for this had not yet come. Contemporary orthodoxy saw nationhood as ideological commitment to a language and history codified by the national movement. Impressed by the achievements of the Serb and Croat national mobilisations, most of the small European-educated Muslim intelligentsia before 1914 chose to adhere to one or the other, while significantly continuing to act almost exclusively in Muslim social and political organisations. The Muslim case showed that religious identity alone could not generate a nationhood, though for most Muslims it could inoculate against the nationalist propaganda of Serbs or Croats.

Church, State and Nation in the Triune Kingdom (Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia)

The direct parallels between religious politics among the Karlowitz and the Bosnian Serbs are naturally absent from the politics of Catholicism in the Croatian lands. What is common to the two situations, nonetheless, are the disruptive effects of the 1867 Dualist settlement for old assumptions, and the heart-searching that resulted on the relations of Church, state and nation. In Croatia too government feared an infection of confessional loyalties by nationalism. There too it sought to counter this through influence on the Church hierarchy. The difference was that in Croatia the nationalist danger was seen to come from the heart of the Croatian Church itself and the hierarchy appealed to was the ultimate authority of Rome. It was strange, the Croatian *Ban* wrote in 1887, that the Catholic clergy were much more in the tow of the Russian-led Panslav movement than their Orthodox counterparts, though the Monarchy was a Catholic state much more favourable to the Catholic Church. [xxiii] What was at issue here?

First, in a Dualist system defined by nationality instead of aristocracy and religion the Croats like other Slavs found themselves downgraded. A strong sense of humiliation before a 'nation of Calvinists, Judaism and freemasonry' pervaded the attitudes to Hungary of Josip Juraj Strossmayer, Bishop of Đakovo, who had led the Croat National Party's unavailing struggle for federalism in the 1860s.[xxiv] The fact that Budapest could impose as Archbishop of Zagreb a Magyarised '*Honvéd padre*', Josip Mihalović (1870) and hold up his successor's appointment for three years (1891-94), during which the Croatian patriotic candidate was eliminated, fed into a general sense that the innocent Slavs had suffered through history not just at the hands of Germans and Magyars but from the feud of 'Greeks and Latins'.[xxv] Second, the Church felt something of the chill of lay hostility, if in less measure than in the Orthodox case. The 'popular school' movement of the 1870s succeeded in eliminating the clergy's right of inspection in the Croatian school law of 1874. Strossmayer, a liberal Catholic in an older generation's sense of wishing to engage with and Christianise the modern world rather than condemn it, was hurt and baffled at the growth of mere indifference, even irreligion, in intellectual circles, including professors in Zagreb University which he had been instrumental in founding in Zagreb. [xxvi] Third, the late nineteenth century was a time of much peasant hardship in the Monarchy's south Slav lands; the Croatian riots of 1883 and 1903 showed how easily peasant discontent could take on anti-Magyar form. It would be wrong to overlook many of the clergy's strong sense of identification with their flock. Croatia, one parish priest told his congregation in 1897, was like the Saviour on the cross, bearing her ills with patient fortitude. Ill, he added with a glance at the outraged District Commissioner present, might come to one also from higher persons who held themselves to be gentlemen, … officials.[xxvii]

The distinctive feature of the Croat Catholic nationalism of Strossmayer and his alter ego, the historian Canon Franjo Rački, both highly gifted men, was its intellectual boldness and the attempt to reconcile religion with distinctly liberal concepts. The natural right of nations to full cultural development presupposed Christianity, the only basis of true humanity, opined Rački.[xxviii] Sharing

the contemporary liberal stress of language as the mark of nationhood, he was led to posit a Yugoslav destiny; meanwhile, however, Croats and Serbs should keep their national names 'until the future shall unite the whole Slavic south in a higher idea to which our age at this moment cannot attain'.[xxix] In an 1876 memorandum to Tsar Alexander II Strossmayer combined religious and national themes in a dizzy synthesis. Russia's unique mission of European reconciliation (Germans and Romance speakers being too aggressive for this role) could only be achieved by a Concordat with the Vatican, which would win over France and Italy, heal the Russo-Polish wound and frustrate the Magyar machinations which had made the Habsburg Monarchy the weak link in the European system. [xxx] In Strossmayer's thought, religious and political perspectives fused in his condemnation of divisions among Slavs brought about by Greek and Latin sins, 'poisoning the national soul and turning into a source of disharmony and discord that which God on a wooden cross transformed into a pledge of eternal love and concord'.[xxxi]

Abandoning conventional politics from 1873, Strossmayer and Rački came to throw their energies into a campaign for the wider use of the Slavonic liturgy in the Catholic Church.[xxxii] The goal was 'the drawing together of Slavdom in faith and Church' in a form which would be acceptable to the Vatican and to Strossmayer's Serbian friends.[xxxiii] Predictably, his motives were impugned as nationalistic, not religious, by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy; the union of Serbs and Croats was a phantasmagory, only Catholicism would suffer. But Strossmayer had the ear of Pope Leo XIII. Despite all the Ballhausplatz's protestations the Vatican concluded a Concordat with Montenegro providing for the introduction of the liturgy there (1886-7) and a Glagolitic missal actually appeared in 1893, a tribute to what foreign minister Kálnoky called Strossmayer's 'restless energy'. [xxxiv]

Nonetheless, the campaign failed in Strossmayer's terms. Even his few fellow-thinkers in the Orthodox world, like the liberal metropolitan Mihailo of Belgrade, could be put off by incautious expressions on Church reunion, while the common response was expressed by three Serb bishops' attack on him in 1881 as an 'unclean spirit' for alleged criticism of Orthodoxy. In a sudden outburst Šima Milinović, sent as Archbishop of Bar to Montenegro to implement the Concordat, confessed that the Montenegrin government under Strossmayer's friend Prince Nikola had obstructed all his efforts to found schools and churches. Catholics had lived 'immeasurably' better under Turkish rule; he was a Slav patriot but before all he was a Catholic priest. [xxxv] An even bigger irony was that the Slav liturgy movement, which had been intended to galvanise the south Slav world, finally took off in Dalmatia and Istria for quite local reasons, as part of the Croat feud with the Italian minority. Moreover, it was led by Strossmayer's domestic political opponents, the anti-Yugoslav Party of Right. In 1901 Croat pressure secured a (temporary) change in the name of the San Girolamo Institute in Rome from *pro gente illyrica* to *pro gente croatica,* a retreat from everything Strossmayer had stood for. By this time, though, Strossmayer's favourite son appeared to be the proselytising Archbishop of Sarajevo, Joseph Stadler, whom he had once distrusted and who was hated by the Serbs. It was an enigmatic end to an illustrious career.

There was also a twist in the tale on the government's side. After the death of the slavophile Leo XIII it was the Curia which opposed illicit use of the Slavonic liturgy and the Ballhausplatz which begged it not to offend Austrophile Slav Dalmatians and Istrians. The ambassador to the Holy See, irritated at being asked to argue for the liturgy in this context and against its inclusion in the Vatican's 1914 Concordat with Serbia, was told that there was a majority for the liturgy in Dalmatia [xxxvi]; Cisleithania, having introduced universal suffrage in 1907, had to muddle through without offending too many people. But another reason for Vienna's change of heart was that the Glagolitic question no longer carried the Panslav charge the regime had seen in Strossmayer's original vision;

in fact, the founder of an academy for the study of Old Slav in 1902, Bishop Mahnić of Krk, was a clerical conservative. Besides, there were simply no longer enough likely candidates for Dalmatian dioceses who were not committed to the liturgy.[xxxvii] To make the situation still more complicated, the Hungarian government did not change course. Prime Minister István Tisza expostulated in 1913 against the introduction of 'ethnographic' concepts in Habsburg south Slav policy which could only weaken the traditional confessional divide on which the Monarchy had relied in maintaining its hold on the south Slav world.[xxxviii] With characteristic sharp, if narrow, vision he pinpointed the theme against which all the permutations in church, state and ethnic relations in the period reviewed here had been played out: the tension between a confessionalising approach to issues of south Slav identity and the secular-orientated nationalism of the age.

Conclusion

The introduction of national-liberal and representative ideas into a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional polity inevitably produced contradictions. Until the 1860, government had felt in charge of the south Slav question. The loyalty of Catholic Croats was assumed; that of Serbs was gained through a relatively generous confessional policy centred around the Karlowitz Patriarchate. The transformation of the ruling institution by Austro-Hungarian Dualism obliterated landmarks. The post-1867 Hungarian government proceeded to act vigorously in the national spirit of the age. It was wholly in character for it to maintain the confessionalist case against the Slavonic liturgy right through to 1914; Fiume was a vital interest of the Hungarian state. Cisleithanian wobbles over the liturgy were equally in character. Once the Austro-Germans had lost power, this polity maintained itself only by jockeying between its squabbling peoples, which helps explains why it came down eventually on the side of the Slav majority against the Italian minority in the coastal provinces. But the Hungarian hardline also contained inconsistencies. By making the Magyar 'ethnographic' idea, to use Tisza's word, the measure of the Hungarian state, it ensured that efforts to confine non-Magyars to confessionalist perspectives could be sustained only by *force majeure.*

The old confessionalist policies survived in purest form in jointly administered Bosnia, where Kállay's energy in pushing them to their logical conclusion only exposed their inadequacy in changed times. The difficulty of controlling the Bosnian Serbs through the Orthodox hierarchy has been shown above. Important also was the inconsistency between confessionalism and Austrian cultural mission, the former prioritising religious values for the natives while leaving the secular civic values in which Kállay actually believed to the state; the somewhat cynical sleight of hand involved ended up alienating both religious traditionalists like Bosnian Muslim elders and educated youth of all creeds.

The shifting balance between religious and ethnic identity posed problems for Church and national leaders too. Orthodox hierarchies were driven onto an unhappy defensive, pinioned between an alien state and aggressive lay rivals. Strossmayer adopted a more positive stance, but his pursuit of Yugoslavism through reconciliation of the Churches overestimated the creative power of religion in a secularising age. For most Yugoslav-minded south Slavs, the religious dimension was as embarrassment to be ignored. The anti-clerical Croat Progressives played a significant role in the Serbo-Croat coalition which in 1905, the year of Strossmayer's death, reestablished a Yugoslav programme on lines very different from his own. The bulk of the Croatian Church, sensing creeping marginalisation, gravitated to the anti-Yugoslav Frankist branch of the Party of Right. Meanwhile, *Srpski sveštenik*, the pre-war journal of the association of Serb Orthodox clergy in Bosnia, abounded in complaints about threats to prestige, the decline of religion and morals and the

arrogance of the secular intelligentsia. The frustration in both Churches portends the links between atavistic confessional nationalism and elements in their ranks a generation later.

Undoubtedly the national intelligentsias had most cause for satisfaction, but there were clouds on their horizon too. Their respective national ideas were intellectual constructs related only partly to the concerns of the vast peasant majority. The inaugural lecture of the Bosnian Serb historian Vladimir Ćorović in Belgrade University in 1919 testifies to a dangerous presumptuousness at the hour of apparent victory. Religion had become a matter of private conviction, he argued. Having played its part in the constitution of the Serbian nation, 'its true significance is limited only to the past…at least for us…it has served its time! [xxxix] The very success of Serb national organisation encouraged complacency. Communal institutions developing from a religious base, such as played a potent role in Ćorović's Bosnia, ultimately wither without the framework of a confessing society, as related experience in Protestant societies has shown. The Serbs in interwar Yugoslavia overestimated their political skill. Thus no thoughtful party to the vexed relationships discussed in this paper should have had cause for complacency in 1914, which in this difficult modern world is only as it should be.

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i L. Hadrovics, *Le peuple serbe et son Église sous la domination turque* (Paris, 1947), p. 119-20.

ii J. Mousset, *La Serbie et son Église* (1830-1914) (Paris, 1938), pp. 329-33.

iii J. Šidak, ``Hrvatski narodni preporod – ideje i problemi', in ibid, *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti XIX stoljeća,* pp. 95-111.

iv E. Turcynski, *Konfession und Nationalität. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen und rumänischen Nationsbildung* (Düsseldorf, 1976).

v H. Haselsteiner, *Die Serben und der Ausgleich. Zur politischen und staatsrechtlichen Stellung der Serben Südungarns in den Jahren 1860-67* (Vienna, 1976), p. 34.

vi The most helpful sources for Karlowitz church autonomy issues in this period are still D. Kirilović (ed.), *Srpski narodni sabori, Spisi bečke Državne arhive*, 2 vols (Novi Sad, 1937-38) and Z Miladinović, *Tumač povlastica zakona, naredaba i drugh naređenja Srpske Narodno-Crkvene Autonomije u Ugarskoj, Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji* (Novi Sad, 1897).

vii D. Ruvarac, *O srpskoj narodno-crkvenoj autonomiji u Ugarskoj* (Sremski Karlovci, 1926).

viii For Eötvös's policies, see P. Bödy, 'Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840-70', *American Philosophical Society, Transactions*, new series 62/3 (1972), pp. 3-134.

ix Országos Levéltár (Budapest), Miniszterelnökség (OL, ME), Patriarch Anđelić to Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza, 28 April, 1885.

x OL, ME, 1883, III/520, Patriarch Anđelić to Prime Minister Tisza, 12 January 1883. Patriarch Bogdanović made the same plea on the operation of government supervision, OL. ME 1912 XXXV/309 – 5869, Bogdanović to Prime Minister Lukács, 23 May 1912.

xi The term of the Serb Liberal leader Polit-Desančić in 1892, Kirilović, *Srpski narodni sabori*, p. 63

xii For party politics, see L. Rakić, 'Radikalna stranka u Vojvodini (do početka XX veka)', *Istraživanja* 3 (1974), pp. 147-308; 4 (1975), pp. 133-250.

xiii A. Lebl, 'Srpska narodna slobodnoumna stranka (1887-1918)', *Istraživanja* 4 (1975), p. 277.

xiv OL, ME, 1912, XXXV/309 – 1928, Prime Minister Lukács to Franz Joseph, 14 June 1912. It may be noted that recent Serb nationalist historiography repeats the identification of traditional Serb religious autonomy with modern national rights. Vasilje Krestić's immensely learned but polemical work, *History of the Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia 1848-1914* (Belgrade, 1997), pp. 225-56, sees the closure of Serb confessional schools in 1870s Croatia only in terms of Croatian attempts to denationalise the Serbs, never in terms of Croatian educational reformers' secular liberal beliefs.

xv Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine, Joint Finance Ministry papers (ABH, JFM), BH 8026/1881: Provincial Government to Joint Finance Ministry, 27 October.

xvi For detailed studies of the Kállay regime: T. Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini (1882-1903)* (Sarajevo, 1987); and of politics and the churches: P. Vrankić, *Religion und Politik in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (1878-1918)* (Paderborn, 1998).

xvii F. Schmid, *Bosnien und die Herzegovina unter der Verwaltung Oesterreich-Ungarns* (Leipzig, 1914) , p. 663; ABH, JFM, PR BH 818/1897: Provincial Government to JFM, 15 January.

xviii ABH, JFM: Kabinettbriefe, 141/1893: Kállay to Kutschera, 9 July (Serbs); Kabinettbriefe; 86/1903: Kállay to Kutschera, 2 May (Muslims).

xix Stadler had answered a highly polemical piece by Kosanović in the first place. Nonetheless, the critical account of metropolitan Kosanović's role in Vrankić, *Religion und Politik*, pp. 148-62 does not seem entirely fair to his difficulties. His letters to his successor, metropolitan Nikolajević, seem to testify to a genuine wish to cooperate with the government in his brief reign: 'Pisma Mitropolita Dabro-bosanskog Save Kosanovića Đorđu Nikolajeviću', *Crkva i život* 2 (1923), br. 3-4.

xx Calculated from *Prvi šematizam srpsko-pravoslavne eparhije banjalučke-bihačke* (Banjaluka, 1901).

xxi ABH, JFM, PR BH 26/19891, n.d. The draft was not actually sent but the intended recipient, Civil Adlatus Kutschera, civil head of the Sarajevo Landesregierung, discussed it approvingly with Kállay.

xxii ABH, JFM, PR BH 1759/1901, Mostar Kreis Commissioner Pittner to the Provincial Government, 24 December.

xxiii Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv (HHSA, PA) XI 261, Khuen-Héderváry to Prime Minister Tisza, 6 May 1887.

xxiv F. Šišić, *Korespondencija Rački-Strossmayer*, 4 vols (Zagreb, 1928-31), iii, p. 220: Strossmayer to Rački, 20 September 1886.

xxv Ibid, i, 388: Rački to Strossmayer, 3 July 1870 for *Honvéd padre*.

xxvi For the backdrop to Strossmayer's religious views; see M. Strecha, *Katoličko Hrvatstvo. Počeci političkog katolicizma u banskoj Hrvatskoj (1897-1904)* (Zagreb, 197), particularly pp. 104-5. For recent assessments, see I. Padovan, ' *Zbornik radova o Josipu Jurju Strossmayeru* (Zagreb, 1997).

xxvii Arhiv Hrvatske, Department of Religious and Educational Affairs. Pras. I. 27/1897: Veliki župan Nikolić to the Department, 28 May 1897.

xxviii '"Ideje Jugoslavenstva" Franje Račkoga u razdoblju njezine formulacije (1860-62)', Historijski zbornik 29-30 (1976-77), p. 331-43.

xxix Ibid., p. 338.

xxx Memorandum printed in V. Košćak (ed.), *Josip Juraj Strossmayer. Franjo Rački. Politički spisi* (Zagreb. 1971), pp. 203-24.

xxxi 'Stara pisma Štromajera knjazu Nikoli', *Zapisi. Glasnik Cetinjskog istorijskog društva*, p. 156: Strossmayer to Prince Nikola, 26 October 1884.

xxxii For a fuller account, see R. Okey, 'Austro-Hungarian Diplomacy and the Campaign for a Slavonic Liturgy in the Catholic Church, 1881-1914', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 70 (1992), pp. 258-83.

xxxiii Šišić, *Korespondencija*, ii, 376: Rački to Strossmayer, 13 April 1881.

xxxiv HHSA, PA XI 260, Kálnoky to Ambassador Revertera, 12 May 1890.

xxxv Arhiv Jugoslavenske akademije, Milinović to Strossmayer, 26 January and 17 February 1890.

xxxvi HHSA, PA XI 262: Foreign Minister Berchtold to Ambassador Schönburg, 24 December 1913; Schönburg to Berchtold, 15 January 1914.

xxxvii For this aspect: E. Saurer, *Die politischen Aspekte der österreichischen Bischofsernenungen 1867-1903* (Vienna, 1968).

xxxviii HHSA, PA XI 267: Prime Minister Tisza to Ambassador Schönburg, 4 December 1913.

xxxix V. Ćorović, 'Vera i rasa u srpskoj prošlosti', in ibid., *Pokreti i dela* (Belgrade, 1921), p. 49.